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Abstract
We introduce non-homothetic preferences into a general equilibrium model of monopo-
listic competition and explore the impact of income inequality on the medium-run macroe-
conomic equilibrium. We find that (i) a suﬃciently high extent of inequality divides the
economy into mass consumption sectors (where firms charge low prices and hire many
workers) and exclusive sectors (where firms charge high prices and hire few workers). (ii)
High inequality may lead to a situation of underemployment and that underemployment
could be ”Keynesian” in the sense that it cannot be cured by downward-flexible real wages.
(iii) A redistribution of income from rich to poor (by means of progressive taxation) leads
to higher employment and such a redistribution is Pareto-improving. (iv) An exogenous
increase in (minimum) real wages have a cost eﬀect (that lets firms reduce their employ-
ment) and a purchasing power eﬀect (that creates an incentive for mass production and
raises aggregate employment) with ambiguous net eﬀects. (v) The economy may feature
multiple equilibria where full-employment and unemployment equilibria co-exist.
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1 Introduction
An old idea in economics holds that a more egalitarian income distribution may be beneficial
for aggregate employment via its eﬀect on consumer demand. For instance, early Keynesian
models have emphasized the ambiguous role of the real wage for output and employment.
As wages are both a major source of production costs and an important source of aggregate
demand, an increase in the real wage leads to higher aggregate employment when the demand
(or purchasing-power) eﬀect outweighs the cost eﬀect. A related argument, frequently brought
forward in the context of economic development, suggests that a high purchasing power of the
lower classes is favorable for the emergence of mass consumption sectors creating employment
opportunities in the more productive segments of the economy. Hence a more egalitarian
society may find it easier to overcome the problem of underemployment.
Central to the above arguments are diﬀerences in income elasticities of product demand
between rich and poor consumers. A redistribution of income from the rich to the poor raises
the aggregate demand for labor because the expansion of demand for the various goods by
the poor outweighs the reduction of demand by the rich. Put diﬀerently, consumers have non-
homothetic preferences. In this paper we explore the general equilibrium implications of such
non-homothetic preferences under the assumption that the various consumer goods are supplied
by monopolistically competitive firms. Our analysis helps to rationalize the arguments stated
above that, prima facie, appear hard to reconcile with rigorous general equilibrium analysis.
By introducing non-homothetic preferences, our analysis diﬀers crucially from standard
general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition. These models typically assume ho-
mothetic or constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES-) preferences, as proposed by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). Understanding the role of non-homothetic preferences for aggregate outcomes
is important for at least three reasons. First, the standard assumption of homothetic pref-
erences is highly unrealistic from an empirical point of view. Previous empirical research on
the shape of Engel curves has uniformly rejected the hypothesis of unit income elasticities for
all products.1 Second, because the representative agent paradigm can no longer be applied,
the aggregate implications of non-homothetic preferences are not well understood. Finally,
non-homothetic preferences provide us with a richer framework in which firms’ mark-ups are
no longer determined by consumer preferences alone but depend in a more complex way on
1For a recent summary of the state of research on Engel-curves, see Lewbel (2006).
2
the fundamental parameters of the economy.
While Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) themselves were more cautious about the CES-assumption
and, in the second part of their seminal article, explored also the implications of variable elas-
ticities of substitution (VES), they abstained from introducing income inequality into their
model. Our analysis shows that introducing such inequality fundamentally changes the char-
acter of the general equilibrium. To keep things simple, we undertake our analysis under the
assumption of quadratic preferences. Quadratic preferences feature linear individual demand
curves (with potentially binding non-negativity constraints) and hence provides us with a sim-
ple and tractable framework of analysis. Nevertheless, the quadratic specification should be
viewed as an example which, as discussed at the end of the paper, extends to more general
specifications of preferences.
The model yields the following results. First, we find that suﬃciently high inequality
divides the economy into mass consumption sectors and exclusive sectors. Such an asymmetric
equilibrium arises even when all sectors are identical ex ante. Under suﬃciently high inequality,
firms choose (and in equilibrium are indiﬀerent) between selling only to rich consumers at high
prices or selling to all consumers at low prices. Exclusive producers go for the former strategy.
They skim the rich’s willingness to pay and set prices that ”exclude” the poor from the market.
Mass producers go for the latter. They set low prices that are aﬀordable not only for the rich
but also for the poor.
Second, high inequality may lead to a situation of underemployment. Suppose there is an
institutionally fixed minimum wage. When inequality is low, mass consumption is prevalent
hence aggregate demand for labor at this wage will be high. In contrast, when inequality is high,
many firms will adopt the exclusive strategy depressing aggregate demand for labor. Hence a
more egalitarian society is more likely to feature full employment (where the minimum wage
does not bind), whereas a more unequal society is more likely to end up in underemployment
with a binding minimum wage.
Third, starting from such a situation of unemployment, a redistribution of income from
the rich to the poor is Pareto-improving. In an underemployment equilibrium, redistributing
income from rich to poor raises aggregate employment, hence aggregate output and incomes
are higher in the new equilibrium. Both rich and poor consumers benefit from the higher
aggregate income and the rich, while losing in relative terms, enjoy higher consumption in the
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new equilibrium.
Fourth, our model can rationalize the above mentioned double role of the real wage as a
cost and a demand factor. An increase in the real wage has two opposing eﬀects. On the one
hand, the higher cost of production induces firms to employ less workers (the ”cost eﬀect”).
On the other hand, a higher real wage also changes the distribution of income in favor of the
poor. The reduced inequality generates incentives for firms to switch from exclusion to mass
consumption which increases aggregate employment (the ”demand eﬀect”). Our simulations
show that the cost eﬀect dominates when wages are initially high, whereas the demand eﬀect
dominates at initially low wages.
Fifth, there may be multiple general equilibria. In one equilibrium, wages are low and
inequality is high, so that the general equilibrium is characterized by a high fraction of ex-
clusive producers and low aggregate employment. The alternative scenario is one with high
wages and low inequality. In this case, the general equilibrium is characterized by a larger
fraction of mass producers and by full employment. The reason behind the multiplicity are
demand complementarities, reminiscent of ”Big Push” arguments emphasized by development
economists.
There are several strands of the macroeconomic literature to which the present paper is
related. Our analysis is most closely related to a recent paper by Saint-Paul (2006). He shows
that monopolistic price setting under non-homothetic preferences may imply that technical
progress reduces wages. When the price elasticity of demand decreases along the demand curve,
monopolistic price setting implies that an increase in productivity (and hence in consumption)
shifts the distribution towards profits. A similar eﬀect shows up in our model. However,
while Saint-Paul (2006) sticks to a representative agent framework, our paper analyzes the
consequences of an unequal distribution for aggregate outcomes.
Another related literature studies how the interaction of non-homothetic preferences and
income distribution aﬀect the sectoral distribution of output and employment in the context
of economic development. Matsuyama (2002) studies a model where income inequality aﬀects
employment in dynamic sectors that generate technical progress via learning-by-doing. He is
interested in the dynamic evolution of the economy, whereas our focus is on aggregate employ-
ment in a static context. Moreover, firms in the Matsuyama model operate on competitive
product markets, whereas in our model firms exert market power and influence the equilib-
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rium outcome via price setting. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) study the eﬀect of income
inequality on market size and manufacturing employment under non-homothetic preferences.
Their focus is on the entry of firms operating with superior technologies whereas mark-ups
and prices are taken as given. In contrast, our analysis focuses on a situation where entry is
prohibited and income distribution eﬀects work via endogenous prices and mark-ups.2
A further literature addresses the issue of whether there may be unemployment when the
labor market is competitive but the product market is not (see Hart 1982, D’Aspremont et al.
1990, Dehez, 1985, and Silvestre, 1990; for a survey of this literature, see Silvestre, 1993). This
literature points out that unemployment may occur when firms’ revenues are bounded so that
labor demand may fall short of labor supply even when the wage rate falls to zero. Such a
possibility also arises in our model. While these papers have been concerned with the existence
of unemployment equilibria in a representative-agent environment, our model focuses on the
eﬀect of heterogenous consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our basic model and derive
a households optimal consumption levels and a monopolist’s optimal prices and quantities. In
section 3 we solve the general equilibrium under the special case that the equilibrium is sym-
metric. Section 4 studies the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium and gives the equilibrium
conditions for such an outcome. Section 5 studies the relationship between inequality and
unemployment. Section 6 and 7 study a full employment and multiple equilibria, respectively.
In section 8 we study the robustness of our results with respect to the central assumptions and
section 9 concludes.
2 Monopolistic competition with quadratic preferences
Preferences. Consider a population of consumers of mass 1. Consumers have identical pref-
erences over a continuum of diﬀerentiated products j ∈ [0,N ]. Consumption of these goods
enters total utility in a symmetric and separable way. The utility gain from consuming c units
of a particular good j is given by v(c(j)) = − (1/2) (s− c(j))2 with s being the saturation
2Other papers that incorporate non-homothetic preferences into a general equilibrium framework are
Falkinger (1994), Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1996), Galor and Moav (2004), and Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller
(2006) in the context of economic growth and Flam and Helpman (1987), Matsuyama (2000), and Mitra and
Trindade (2005) in the context of international trade.
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level. The consumer maximizes total utility
u({c(j)}) =
Z N
0
v(c(j))dj = −
Z N
0
[s− c(j)]2
2
dj (1)
subject to the budget constraint
R N
0 p(j)c(j)dj ≤ y. This yields first order conditions
c(j) = s− λp(j) if p(j) ≤ s/λ, and (2)
c(j) = 0 if p(j) > s/λ,
with λ as the consumer’s marginal utility of income. We note consumers diﬀer in λ (because
they earn diﬀerent incomes). While the quadratic utility assumption may seem special, we
discuss at the end of the paper that this serves as an example that generalizes to a broader
class of preferences.
Technology. All goods are produced with the same technology. Production takes place with
labor as the only production factor. We assume a simple linear technology x(j) = al(j) where
x(j) is output of good j and l(j) is the labor input. The productivity parameter a > 0 is an
exogenously given constant.
Endowments. Consumers are heterogenous with respect to their incomes. As the income
level is endogenously determined in the model, the distribution we take is given is that of labor
endowments, and that of shares in monopolistic profits. Assume that a poor household owns
∆P units of labor and the rich own ∆P units. Since we have normalized aggregate labor supply
to unity we have β∆P + ∆P (1− β) = 1. This leave us with one degree of freedom and we
take ∆P ≡ δ as exogenous from which ∆R = (1− βδ) / (1− β) is determined. Similarly, we
assume that profits distributed to a poor household amount to a fraction ΓP < 1 of profits per
capita and profits distributed to a rich household amount to ΓR > 1. Again, we must have
βΓP + ΓR (1− β) = 1 and we take ΓP ≡ γ as exogenous from which ΓR = (1− βγ) / (1− β)
is determined. We concentrate on the (realistic) case where the poor rely more heavily on
labor income (and suﬀer more heavily from unemployment) which is the case when γ < δ.
Occasionally, we will focus on the special case when workers own no firm shares and firm
owners do not work which is the case when γ = 0 and δ = 1/β; or on the case of equal income
composition when γ = δ.3
3The resulting Lorenz-curve is piecewise linear, with slope δ`+ γ(1− `) over the range (0,β) and with slope
(1− βδ) /(1 − β) · `+ (1− βγ) /(1 − β) · (1 − `) over the range (β, 1), where ` is the economy-wide share of
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The resource constraint. Aggregate labor supply is equal to unity as each consumer in-
elastically supplies one unit of labor. Aggregate labor demand is the sum of market demands
to produce the various goods. Denote the market demand for good j by x(j), then the market
demand for labor in sector j is x(j)/a. The economy’s resource constraint can then be written
as
1 ≥ 1
a
Z N
0
x(j)dj. (3)
Equilibrium quantities. We assume the market for each good is monopolistic. There is a
mass of N monopolists who are unique suppliers for their respective product and who set prices
to maximize profits. Entry is prohibited. Each firm is negligible relative to the aggregate and
takes wages and the prices for all other goods as given. The level of market demand faced by
firm j is simply the sum of individual demands. Using first order conditions 2 for the respective
types of consumers (noting that their λ’s are diﬀerent), the market demand function of this
firm, x(j, p(j)), can be expressed as
x(j, p(j)) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0
(1− β) [s− λRp(j)]
s− [βλP + (1− β)λR] p(j)
if p(j) ∈ [s/λR,∞),
if p(j) ∈ [s/λP , s/λR),
if p(j) ∈ [0, s/λP ) .
(4)
When the price exceeds the reservation price of the rich, p(j) ≥ s/λR, market demand is
zero; when the price is between the reservation prices of rich and poor, p(j) ∈ (s/λP , s/λR],
only rich consumers purchase; when the price falls short of the reservation price of the poor,
p(j) < s/λP , both rich and poor consumers purchase (Figure 1).
Figure 1
Now consider a firm’s profit maximizing price. The monopolist being very small relative
to the aggregate economy takes the wage rate and the prices of all other goods as given (i.e. it
takes the consumers’ λ’s as given.) The firm chooses the price p(j) that maximizes the profit
function [p(j)−w/a]x(j, p(j)). As the market demand function (4) is piecewise linear, there
are two candidates for that price. The profit-maximizing price along the steep segment (where
wages in total income. While β, γ, and δ are exogenous parameters of the model (that will be the focus of
comparative static analysis later on) the labor share ` will be endogensouly determined. This means that the
size distribution of income is endogenously determined as well.
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only the rich buy) or the profit-maximizing price along the flat segment (where all consumers
buy). Given p¯, the monopoly price along the steep segment and p, the equilibrium quantities
along the respective segments can be calculated
Lemma 1 Denote by xE and xM the equilibrium quantities supplied along the steep and the
flat segment of the market demand curve, respectively. These quantities are given by xE =
(1− β)s (p¯− w/a) / (2p¯− w/a) and xM = s(p− w/a)/(2p− w/a).
Proof. See Appendix A.
3 The symmetric equilibrium
Recall that all firms face the same demand and cost functions. This implies that, in equilib-
rium, all firms must earn the same profit. There are two possible outcomes: (i) a symmetric
equilibrium where all firms charge the low price and all consumers purchase all goods; (ii) an
asymmetric equilibrium where firms are indiﬀerent between the high and the low price. In the
latter case some firms charge high prices and sell only to the rich; and some firms charge a low
price and serve the whole customer base. In other words, pricing decisions lead to a particular
industry structure that divides the economy into ”mass consumption sectors” and ”exclusive
goods sectors”.
Let us briefly discuss the symmetric case. In the symmetric equilibrium, all firms operate
along the flat segment of the market demand curve and supply xM in equilibrium. We are free
to choose a numeraire, so let us set p = 1 and interpret w as the real wage. Aggregate demand
LD for labor is given by
LD(w) =
sN
a
1− w/a
2− w/a. (5)
When there is a perfectly competitive labor market, the general equilibrium is characterized
by LD(w∗) = 1 where w∗ is the market clearing wage, given by
w∗ = a
sN − 2a
sN − a . (6)
As pointed out by Saint-Paul (2006), this equilibrium has two interesting features. First, for
the existence of an equilibrium where the labor force is fully employed we must have sN/2 > a.
Notice, however, that N , s, and a are exogenous and nothing prevents parameter values to be
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such that the full employment is not feasible. When the full employment condition is violated,
the real wage falls to zero and even with a zero real wage, labor demand falls short of labor
supply. The reason is intuitive. s/2 is the level of output that maximizes a firm’s revenue
and, when w = 0, the output level s/2 also maximizes profits. Hence sN/2 is the highest
aggregate output level that is consistent with profit-maximization. a is the full employment
output. When sN/2 < a firms are not willing to supply the full employment output even when
the production of output is costless. In other words, there is no wage w∗ ≥ 0 that clears the
labor market.
Second, technical progress (an increase in a) may not be as favorable and even harmful for
workers. At low levels of a, technical progress leads to increases in w but less than proportional.
At high levels of a technical progress may reduce real wages. (And if a gets very large, the full
employment condition gets violated.) The reason is the following: When demand functions
feature decreasing price elasticities (such as in the linear case), a higher feasible output level
is associated with higher mark-ups and a lower real wage. In such a situation, an increase in a
increases the wedge between a worker’s productivity and the wage rate. In the present context,
technical progress may even drive down the wage to very low levels, a situation reminiscent
of Marx’s vision of technical progress as a cause of exploitation and the pauperization of the
proletariat.
4 The asymmetric equilibrium
An asymmetric outcome arises from the combination of two features: non-homothetic prefer-
ences and a suﬃciently high extent of economic inequality. In this section we solve the model
in the asymmetric case. We derive a suﬃcient condition for an asymmetric outcome, charac-
terize the equilibrium conditions, and describe how the model can be solved. In later sections
we then explore the eﬀects changes in inequality under alternative equilibrium scenarios — an
unemployment equilibrium, a full employment equilibrium, and multiple equilibria.
4.1 Existence of an asymmetric equilibrium
In the asymmetric equilibrium some firms sell to rich consumers at high prices and other
firms sell to all household. To check when this is actually the case, we consider a single firm’s
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incentive to deviate (= sell to the rich at the high price), given a situation where all other firms
sell to all households. It turns out that the exclusion strategy is worthwhile if the rich are much
wealthier than the poor. This is very intuitive. Were rich and poor almost identical, the steep
segment of the market demand curve would become irrelevant. The following proposition gives
a suﬃcient condition that a symmetric equilibrium does not exist. In that case, the equilibrium
is asymmetric.
Proposition 1 If γ ≤ δ, an asymmetric equilibrium exists if β > 4δ(1−ζ)
2
4δ2ζ(1−ζ)−4δζ+(1+δ)2 with
ζ ≡ a/ (sN).
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is easy to check that the right hand side of this inequality goes to zero if δ → 0, goes to
unity if δ → 1, and is monotonically increasing over this range as can be easily checked. Hence,
and confirming our intuition, the above condition in Proposition 1 is more likely to hold with
higher inequality, that is, when β is large and/or δ is small. This confirms our claim that,
when inequality is suﬃciently high, an asymmetric outcome will prevail.
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that the right-hand-side of the condition decreases
in ζ. A rise in ζ implies there are more (β, δ)-combinations for which the condition in the
proposition is violated, so that an asymmetric equilibrium becomes more likely. The reason is
the following. A higher level of a/(sN) means - in equilibrium - higher production per firm and
allows an increase in consumption for both groups. This increases mark-ups as both types of
consumers purchase at a less elastic point on their individual demand curves. However, since
rich consumers are closer to their saturation point than the average consumer this causes a
disproportionate decrease in their demand elasticity. In other words, when a/(sN) increases
mark-ups increase more strongly when firms sell exclusively to the rich and increase less strongly
when they sell on mass markets. As a result, the exclusion strategy becomes more attractive.
4.2 Equilibrium conditions
Let us now characterize the asymmetric equilibrium. There is a fraction of n < 1 firms that
sells to the whole customer base at the low price (mass producers) and a fraction of 1−n firms
who sell only to the rich at the high price (exclusive producers). As we are free to order goods,
we arrange the index j in such a way that goods j ∈ [0, nN ] are mass consumption goods and
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goods j ∈ (nN,N ] are exclusive goods.
The asymmetric equilibrium can be represented in terms of three conditions. The first
condition states that firms are indiﬀerent between the mass consumption and the exclusive
strategy, ΠM = ΠE. Profits are ΠM = (1−w/a)xM for a mass producer and ΠE = (p¯−w/a)xE
for an exclusive producer. Using Lemma 1 this equilibrium condition can be expressed in terms
of the endogenous variables w and p¯
s(1− β)(p¯−w/a)
2
2p¯− w/a = s
(1−w/a)2
2− w/a . (7)
It is straightforward to verify that equation (7) can be solved for the price of the exclusive
good p¯ and expressed as a function of the real wage w.4 For further use express the equilibrium
condition (7) as p¯ = g(w) with g0(w) < 0. The negative relationship between p¯ and w is
very intuitive. A reduction in the wage rate w increases profits per unit of output by the
same (absolute) amount both for exclusive producers and for mass producers. With prices
unchanged, their larger market size lets profits of mass producers increase more strongly than
the profits of exclusive producers. To restore equilibrium, a higher price p¯ is required to prevent
exclusive producers from switching to the mass consumption strategy.
The second equilibrium condition follows from the fact that consumers’ budget constraints
have to be exhausted. As a results the relative incomes of rich to poor must be equal to their rel-
ative consumption expenditures. Formally, we must have yR/yP =
£
nNcMR + (1− n)Np¯cER
¤
/nNcMP .
It is easy to show that relative incomes of rich to poor yR/yP can be written as a function of the
wage w and the unemployment rate u. The income level of a poor consumers as yP = δw(1−
u)+γNΠ(w) and of a rich consumer as yR = (1−βδ)/(1−β)·w(1−u)+(1−βγ)/(1−β)·NΠ(w)
where we observe that equilibrium profits are Π(w) = (1− w/a)2/(2− w/a) from (7). Notice
that earnings from labor depend not only on the wage rate but also on the extent to which a
consumer’s labor force is utilized.5 Hence we can write yR/yP = φ(w, u), with ∂φ/∂w < 0 and
4Equation (7) is a quadratic equation in p¯ with the relevant root
p¯ = w/a+
h
(1−w/a)2 + (1− w/a)
p
1− β (2−w/a)w/a
i
/ [(1− β) (2− w/a)] .
Clearly, p¯ is increasing in w.
5When there is unemployment, we assume all households are equally aﬀected. This is, unemployment takes
the form of a reduction in hours worked, the same for all households. We make this assumption for analytical
convenience. It ensures that also in an equilibrium with unemployment there are only two types of consumers.
Alternatively, we could assume that only a fraction u of all households are aﬀected by unemployment whereas
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∂φ/∂u > 0. The partial derivatives of φ indicate that the poor suﬀer more from a wage cut
and/or from an increase in unemployment than the rich because they have to rely more heavily
on labor income that the rich, δ > γ. Relative consumption expenditures can be expressed in
terms of the endogenous variables w and n using the expressions for cMR , c
E
R, and c
M
P in the
proof of Lemma 1 and condition (7) to rewrite the price of exclusive goods as p¯ = g(w)
φ(w,u) =
n (2g(w)− 1− w/a) / (2g(w)−w/a) + (1− n)g(w) (g(w)− w/a) / (2g(w)− w/a)
n [1− (1/β) (1/ (2− w/a)− (1− β) / (2g(w)− w/a))] .
(8)
We note that equation (8) is linear in n and can be expressed as a function of w and u. For
further use we express this relationship as n = h(w, g(w),φ(w,u)) ≡ n(w, u).
We get our third equilibrium condition from the economy’s resource constraint. Aggregate
labor demand is given by LD =
£
nNxM + (1− n)NxE
¤
/a.We use the expressions in Lemma 1
to replace xM and xE, and equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) we replace n by h(w, p¯,φ(w,u) ≡
n(w, u). Aggregate labor demand in general equilibrium can be expressed as
LD(w, u) =
sN
a
µ
n(w, u)
1− w/a
2− w/a + (1− n(w, u))(1− β)
g(w)−w/a
2g(w)− w/a
¶
. (9)
The above equation has a very intuitive interpretation. Labor demand is proportional to
sN/a, the number of workers needed to produce at the economy’s saturation point. The term
in parenthesis reflects the ”distance” to saturation in this monopolistic economy. This depends
on the percentage mass consumption firms n(w, u) and the demand for labor in these firms
(proportional to (1− w/a) / (2−w/a)) as well as on the percentage exclusive firms 1−n(w,u)
and the demand for labor in these firms (proportional to (g(w)− w/a) / (2g(w)− w/a)). Notice
that the term in parenthesis has its maximum at 1/2 when n = 1 and w = 0. In this case all
firms are mass producers and supply the revenue maximizing quantity.
the remaining households are fully employed. This would complicate our analysis by creating four types of
consumers: the unemployed poor, the unemployed rich, the employed poor and the employed rich. In such an
equilibrium, firms would not only the choice between mass consumption and exclusion but between selling only
the richest, to the richest and second richest, to the richest, second richest and third richest, or to all households.
Obviously, this would complicate the exposition considerably without adding much substance to the analysis.
The equilibrium presented in the text is identical to the one obtained from a four group economy, where selling
only to the unemployed poor (instead of all poor) and selling only to the unemployed rich (instead of all rich)
is never a profitable option.
12
To understand the shape of this general-equilibrium-labor-demand curve it is instructive
to compare the aggregate labor-demand curve (9) with some well-known standard cases. In
the case of perfect competition labor demand is horizontal (since marginal costs are constant)
at w = a. In the case of monopolistic competition with CES preferences, labor demand is hor-
izontal but at a lower level reflecting the fact that part of a worker’s output is appropriated by
the monopolistic firm. In the present context, where preferences exhibit a decreasing elasticity
of substitution and where there is economic inequality, there is a much more complex relation-
ship between employment and the real wage. This relationship is the result of two diﬀerent
channels. First, a higher demand for labor reflects higher production in each market. With a
decreasing price elasticity of demand this implies higher equilibrium mark-ups and a lower real
wage. Second, to the extent that a lower real wage is associated with a more uneven distribu-
tion of income there will be less mass consumption sectors and more exclusive sectors which,
ceteris paribus, reduces employment. As these two channels imply contradicting relationships,
the aggregate relationship between employment and the real wage is not a priori clear. Hence,
at a given real wage, the aggregate labor-demand curve may be upward or downward sloping.
In equilibrium, total labor supply is not necessarily fully employed and only a fraction
1− u of all workers may have a job, where u is the unemployment rate. So, our third general
equilibrium condition becomes
1− u = LD(w, u). (10)
In a full employment equilibrium, we have u = 0 and equation (10) solves the model for the real
wage w. In an unemployment equilibrium we either have a situation where there is a positive
minimum wage w = w¯ > 0 or, in the absence of a minimum wage, we have a situation where
the labor market does not clear even when the wage falls to zero (see Figure 2). Once we have
solved for either u or w, the remaining endogenous variables p¯ and n can be determined using
(7) and (8).
Figure 2
5 Economic inequality and unemployment
In this section we explore the asymmetric equilibrium when there is unemployment. In partic-
ular, we examine the impact of economic inequality (as captured by the parameters β, γ, and
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δ) on the general equilibrium. We start with the special case when the labor market is per-
fect and parameters are such that unemployment arises even when the real wage falls to zero.
While one might argue this is not an empirically relevant case, it is nevertheless instructive
because it yields a very simple and intuitive solution which carries over to the more relevant
case when unemployment is associated with a positive minimum wage.
5.1 A special case: unemployment with a zero wage
In the symmetric equilibrium, we saw that unemployment with a zero wage arises whenNs/2 <
a. In the asymmetric equilibrium, unemployment arises under weaker conditions. While mass
producers reach their profit (and revenue) maximizing output still at s/2, the profit maximizing
output of exclusive firms is already reached at output level (1−β)s/2.When nN firms are mass
producers and (1 − n)N firms are exclusive producers, the highest level of output that firms
are willing to supply in the asymmetric equilibrium is nNs/2 + (1− n)N(1− β)s/2 < sN/2.
We can easily solve for the asymmetric unemployment equilibrium by setting w = 0 in
equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (10). Condition (7) simplifies to
p¯ = 1/ (1− β) .
The left-hand side of condition (8) becomes yR/yP = φ(0, u) = (1− βγ) / (1− β) . When
wages are zero, the relative income of rich to poor consumers is solely determined by relative
profit shares. Using w = 0 and p¯ = 1/ (1− β) on the right-hand-side of (8) and solving for n
yields
n =
γ
β
.
Finally, plug w = 0, n = γ/β, and p¯ = 1/ (1− β) into equilibrium condition (10) to get the
equilibrium level of unemployment
u = 1− sN
2a
(1 + γ − β) .
These results are very intuitive. If inequality increases because relative income of the poor γ
goes down, or because the group size of the poor β increases, more firms find it optimal to
charge a price that the poor cannot aﬀord and sell exclusively to the rich. This reduces the share
of mass producers, decreases the demand for labor even further and increases unemployment.
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This result has striking welfare implications. Consider a redistribution of endowments
from the rich to the poor such that γ rises and β remains constant. This implies that n = γ/β
increases and more products are sold to all consumers. Using the expressions in the proof of
Lemma 1 and setting w = 0 yields cMR = (1 + β)s/2 and c
M
P = βs/2 for mass consumption
goods j ∈ [0, nN ] and cER = s/2 and cEP = 0 for exclusive goods j ∈ (nN,N ].
A redistribution of income from the rich to the poor which increases γ increases the share
of mass consumption goods but has not eﬀect on the equilibrium quantities on mass market
and on exclusive markets. Such a redistribution clearly benefits the poor. They can purchase
more mass consumption goods, and purchase any given mass consumption good in the same
quantity as before. More surprisingly, such a redistribution also benefits the rich. When the
share of mass consumption sectors n increases, there are more sectors with a low price (where
the rich purchase in high quantity), and less sector with a high price (where the rich purchase
in low quantity). This allows to rich to increase their overall consumption and welfare. Stated
diﬀerently, a redistribution of (firm share) endowments from the rich to the poor creates
additional demand. This increases the degree of resource utilization and creates additional
income. Both groups of consumers benefit from the higher income and can increase their
consumption.
We summarize these results in the following
Proposition 2 a) In an asymmetric unemployment equilibrium with a zero wage, a redistri-
bution of income from rich to poor increases aggregate output and employment. b) Such a
redistribution is Pareto-improving.
5.2 Unemployment with positive minimum wage
The case where wages become literally zero may sound implausible to many readers. The
real wage in modern economies is far from zero. In contrast, most workers participate in
achieved societal standards of living. Labor market institutions such as union bargaining and,
in particular, minimum wage legislation prevent the real wage from falling to zero.
It is therefore interesting to study how inequality aﬀects aggregate output and employ-
ment in the more relevant case when there is a positive minimum wage w¯ > 0.6 Equilibrium
6Notice that w¯ is a real wage (more precisely, the real consumption wage of the poor). This minimum real
wage could be implemented by indexing wages to the cost of living of the poor. This fixes the mark-up for mass
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unemployment can be determined from (10)
1− u = LD(w¯, u).
Recall that we used the function n = n(u; w¯) to express the resource balance condition (10)
in terms of u as the unique endogenous variable. From equation (8), it is easy to show that
n and u are negatively related. When there is higher unemployment, the extent of exclusion
is larger. The reason is that higher unemployment increases relative incomes of rich to poor
(because δ > γ). The higher relative income of rich to poor makes it more attractive for firms
to sell exclusively to the rich at the high price rather than serving the entire customer base
which decreases the share of mass consumption sectors.
The situation is drawn in Figure 2 above. The Figure is drawn in such a way that there
is no intersection between labor demand and labor supply curve. In other words, there exists
no positive wage that clears the market. The labor supply curve is a vertical line. Under
the parameter values chosen for Figure 2, the labor demand curve first falls and then bends
backwards. With a minimum wage w¯ > 0, the intersection of this minimum wage floor with
the labor demand curve determines aggregate employment (and output).
Is Proposition 2 still valid? The answer is yes. To see these employment eﬀects consider
a redistribution of income from rich to poor such that γ and/or δ increase. We see from
(7) that such a change leaves relative prices of exclusive to mass consumption goods g(w¯)
unaﬀected. We also see that an increase in γ and/or δ raises the relative income of rich to poor
φ(w¯, u). We know from (8) that the share of mass consumption sectors n = h(w¯, g(w¯),φ(w¯, u))
unambiguously increases in φ. We know further that, holding the unemployment rate constant,
aggregate labor demand increases if the share of mass consumption sectors n increases. This
implies that, in the new equilibrium, aggregate labor demand is higher and unemployment is
lower. Notice that there is a reinforcing eﬀect on labor demand that comes from the eﬀect of
the unemployment rate on relative incomes φ(w¯, u). Since the poor depends more heavily on
labor income, δ > γ, the reduction in unemployment benefits the poor are more strongly than
the rich and increases relatives incomes even further. Hence the unemployment-reducing eﬀect
of the redistribution reinforces the positive employment eﬀect.
consumption goods and, via the equal-profit condition, also the mark-up for exclusive goods.
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Figure 3
Now consider the eﬀect of this redistribution on welfare. We see from equation (7) that
profits in the new equilibrium do not depend on δ and/or γ and remain unchanged. From
(7) we also see that both the prices g(w¯) and output levels (g(w¯)− w¯/a) / (2g(w¯)− w¯/a) of
exclusive goods remain unchanged as well. This implies that the rich consume exclusive goods
in the same quantity as before. From equation (2) it must be that the rich consume also mass
consumption goods in the same quantity as before. Since in the new equilibrium there are more
mass consumption sectors, there are more sector where the rich consume in high quantity and
less sectors where the rich consume in low quantity. Just like before, the welfare level of the
rich increases.
Less surprisingly, also the welfare level of the poor increases. They consume mass con-
sumption goods in the same quantity as before and because there are more mass consumption
sector in the new equilibrium, they consume more in total which increases their welfare. We
summarize the above discussion in the following
Proposition 3 a) In an asymmetric unemployment equilibrium with a positive minimum wage
w¯ ≥ 0, a redistribution of endowments from rich to poor increases aggregate output and em-
ployment. b) Such a redistribution is Pareto-improving.
The above proposition states that a more equal distribution of income may be favorable
for aggregate output and employment. One obvious way how such a redistribution can be
achieved is progressive taxation.
A diﬀerent way to influence the distribution of income which is adopted in many countries
is minimum wage legislation. It is therefore suggestive to ask how an increase in the minimum
wage aﬀects macroeconomic outcomes. A minimum wage increase has two opposing eﬀects: a
cost eﬀect and a demand (purchasing power) eﬀect. The cost eﬀect lets firms move up their
individual labor demand curves. This clearly decreases employment. The purchasing power
eﬀect arises because increasing the minimum wage leads to a more equitable distribution of
income. This induces former exclusive producers to become mass producers. As switching
from exclusion to mass consumption is associated with an increase in output and employment
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for the individual firm, an increase in the number of mass producers is associated with higher
output and employment in the aggregate.
The two eﬀects can be readily seen from inspection of equation (10). The cost eﬀect shows
up in the labor demands of mass and exclusive producers which are, respectively, given by
xM(w¯) = (1− w¯/a) / (2− w¯/a) and xE(w¯) = (g(w¯)− w¯/a) / (2g(w¯)− w¯/a) .7 Since g(w¯) is
falling in w¯, it is immediately clear that increasing w¯ reduces the labor demands of exclusive
and mass producers. The purchasing power eﬀect shows up in the function n(u; w¯). As long
as the increase in w¯ increases in n (which holds for most parameter values), the purchasing
power eﬀect stimulates employment and output. The reason is the same as above. When a
minimum wage increase changes the distribution in favor of the poor, the higher purchasing
power of the poor gives firms an additional incentive to supply mass consumption rather than
exclusive goods and switching from exclusion from mass consumption raises employment.
We can easily make these arguments using Figure 3. An increase in the minimum wage
w¯ shifts the minimum wage floor in Figure 3 upwards, but does not aﬀect the labor demand
curve. The relative importance of cost- and purchasing power eﬀect shows up in the slope
of the labor demand curve. In Figure 3, the labor demand curve is downward sloping at the
point of intersection. In that situation increasing the minimum wage reduces employment.
In other words, the cost eﬀect dominates. At lower wage levels, the labor demand curve has
a positive slope. In that case, the purchasing power eﬀect dominates and minimum wages
increase aggregate employment.
Now consider the eﬀects on consumer welfare. Recall that we have assumed that all house-
hold are equally aﬀected by unemployment. When the demand eﬀect dominates and unemploy-
ment decreases, all consumers benefit as they can better utilize their labor force and increase
7Notice that our discussion in the text assumes that government authorities set a minimum wage per eﬃciency
unit of labor w¯. In reality, governments want to ensure a minimum wage income for the low qualified. Hence
legistlation sets a wage floor on (hourly) earnings. Suppose minimum wage legistlation requires firms to pay at
least w¯ to a full time worker and that the poor supply less eﬃciency units than the rich δ < 1. In that case the
legislation ensures a minimum wage income of w¯ for the poor and - since the poor supply δ eﬃciency units of
labor - implicitely establishes a compensation of w¯/δ per eﬃciency unit of labor. If the minimum wage is binding,
market forces will lead to a situation where (rich and poor) workers earn the same wage per eﬃciency unit of
labor. Since the rich supply (1− βδ) /(1 − β) eﬃciency units their compensation is w¯ (1− βδ) /(δ (1− β)) .
Hence, in the present context, setting a minimum labor labor income for low-income workers is identical to
fixing the minimum wage per eﬃciency unit of labor which is discussed in the text.
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their income. When the cost eﬀect dominates and unemployment increases, all households lose
as their income is reduced.
Proposition 4 a) An increase in the minimum wage has a cost eﬀect, decreasing aggregate
output and employment; and a demand eﬀect increasing output and employment. b) An in-
crease in the minimum wage is Pareto-improving if the demand eﬀect dominates and is Pareto-
inferior when the cost eﬀect dominates.
6 Full employment
Now consider a full employment equilibrium. In such an equilibrium minimum wages do not
bind and we have u = 0 and w = w∗ where w∗ is the market clearing wage. From (10) we get
an equation in the endogenous variable w∗
1 = LD(w∗, 0). (11)
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium graphically. Labor supply, the left-hand-side of equation
(11) is horizontal and the right-hand-side of equation (11) is downward sloping at high wage
but may bend backward at lower wages. Figure 4 is drawn in such a way that there is unique
equilibrium at point A. At this point the labor demand curve slopes downward. The latter
situation also guarantees stability (in the sense that wages increases due to excess demand for
labor pushes the economy closer towards the market clearing wage).
Figure 4
It is interesting to see how, under full employment, the fraction of mass consumption
sectors and the distribution of income between wages and profits are aﬀected by the extent of
economic inequality. Let us again consider the eﬀect of a redistribution from rich to poor by
increasing γ and/or δ. Such a redistribution increases φ(w) and unambiguously increases n,
see equilibrium condition (8). This implies that, for a given wage w, a larger share of mass
products increases the aggregate demand for labor. In terms of Figure 4, the labor demand
curve shifts to the right. Since, the labor demand schedule cuts the labor supply curve from
above, the new equilibrium is associated with a higher market clearing real wage w∗. A higher
real wage is directly associated with a lower mark-up for mass producers 1 − w∗/a. Because
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the price of exclusive goods g(w) depends negatively on w (see condition (7)), it follows that
the exclusive producers’ mark-up g(w∗)−w∗/a falls.
Proposition 5 a) In an asymmetric equilibrium with full employment, an increase in inequal-
ity increases the extent of exclusion (decreases n). b) Increasing inequality increases mark-ups
and profits, and decreases the real wage.
Proof. See Appendix.
The economic intuition behind this result follows immediately from our previous analysis.
A redistribution of income in favor of the poor creates an incentive for firms to adopt the mass
consumption strategy. The rich loose purchasing power which, for a given n, decreases the
profit of exclusive producers. Hence some firms will switch to the mass consumption strategy
and increase their demand more labor. This drives up the real wage and decreases profit
margins.
7 Multiple equilibria
When the income ratio yR/yP = φ(w, u) decreases in w, there is an additional factor aﬀecting
aggregate labor demand (9). For lower levels of the real wage w, inequality is higher and
thus the number of mass consumption goods n is lower. This additional eﬀect decreases labor
demand. As simulations show, this eﬀect may be so strong such that the labor demand schedule
bends backwards giving rise to multiple equilibria. Intuitively, in an equilibrium with low wage
w inequality is high. This implies that many firms choose to sell to the rich only. However, this
causes labor demand to be low which supporting an equilibrium where the wage rate is low.
Instead, if the equilibrium wage is high, inequality and exclusion is on a low level such that
labor demand is high supporting a high-wage equilibrium with full employment. As shown in
Figure 5, equilibria with full employment and unemployment coexist: two equilibria feature
full employment and one equilibrium is characterized by unemployment.
Figure 5
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8 How general are our results?
In this paper we have presented an model where consumers have non-homothetic preferences
and where the distribution of income plays a central role for aggregate employment. Our
model has started out from simplifying assumptions. Let us briefly discuss the robustness of
our results with respect to these assumptions.
Preferences In our model we have assumed a quadratic subutility function. We used the
quadratic specification because it keeps the analysis simple and yields closed form solutions.
The quadratic subutility function has two crucial properties. First, the marginal utility from
consuming the first unit is finite, v0(0) = s <∞. This is a necessary condition for an equilibrium
where poor consumers are not able to aﬀord all goods (i.e. the non-negativity constraint may
become binding). Second, the quadratic specification implies that a linear demand curve of a
particular consumer and a price elasticity of demand which decreases in consumed quantity.
Denoting by η(c) the price elasticity of demand we have η(c) = (s− c) /c which is decreasing
in c.8
Our analysis extends in a straightforward way to the subclass of hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) preferences that feature v0(0) < ∞. HARA-preferences with that property
also feature decreasing price elasticities along individual demand curves. Provided that this
elasticity falls below unity at a finite c, both unemployment and full employment equilibria are
possible under appropriate parameter values. We elaborate this in more detail in appendix D.
Going beyond HARA, things become more complicated because the distribution of income does
not only aﬀect consumption along the extensive margin (how many consumers can purchase a
certain good) but also the intensive margin. As Engel-curves are no longer aﬃn-linear, market
demand curves depend on the distribution of income even in symmetric equilibria.9
8Note that the properties of a quadratic subutility function are quite diﬀerent from those of the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. In that case, v0(0) =∞, so that even the poorest consumers purchases all goods that
are supplied (albeit in tiny amounts); and the elasticity of demand η(c) is the same for all consumers, i.e. does
not depend on consumed quantities.
9Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller (2004) analyze the impact of inequality on mark-ups in the context of a symmetric
full employment equilibrium. It turns out that it depends on the curvature of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion, −v00(c)/v0(c), whether higher inequality in the size distribution of income increases or decreases the
mark-up.
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Entry An important assumption of our analysis was a fixed number of firms. What happens
if we allow for entry? As the demand for labor is increasing in the number of firms, allowing
entry is an obvious ways of eliminating unemployment. To see this, consider the original Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) framework in which homogeneous labor is used both in setting up new
firms and in producing final output. In that case, low wages would eliminate unemployment
by making entry of new firms very cheap. However, in reality may be diﬃcult even if wages
for homogenous labor are very low. Product market regulations and/or scarce resources (such
as entrepreneurial talent, ideas, specific skills/technologies) could be reasons which entry is
prohibitively expensive.
To illustrate that the flavor of our results survives also in more elaborate contexts, appendix
C sketches a simple model with skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are needed to
create a new firm and both types of workers can be used to produce final output. We show
that, if skilled workers are not a necessary input in final goods production, unemployment can
arise even if the unskilled wage goes to zero. In that case, we are back in the model studied in
section 6 and all results discussed there go through.
Factor substitution Our model has assumed that labor is the only production factor and
that there is no possibility of factor substitution. Introducing capital into the picture does lead
to a substantial change of our results. To see this, suppose output is produced with homogenous
labor and physical capital using the production function aF˜ (k, l). With a given number of firms
(and associated maximum level of employment), eliminating unemployment would require to
reduce labor productivity. However, as long as labor has a positive marginal product, which
increases in the capital stock, capital and labor will ”compete” for employment. A higher
(fully employed) capital stock will make things even worse: By increasing the productivity of
workers the demand for labor will become even smaller. Therefore, not considering capital as
a production factor and the associated possibility of factor substitution, while being essential
for the details of the equilibrium, does not aﬀect our general conclusion.
More general distributions A simplifying assumption of our analysis was that there are
only two types of consumers, rich and poor. How would the analysis change by allowing
for arbitrarily many groups? To get the intuition how the analysis extends to many groups,
consider three groups. A candidate for a general equilibrium would be a situation where
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some firms sell only to the rich, other firms sell to the rich and the middle class and a final
group of firms sells to all consumers. Whether or not such an equilibrium arises depends on
how diﬀerent the various groups are. When rich, middle class and poor diﬀer only slightly, a
symmetric equilibrium will arise. When the rich and the middle class are very similar, there
will be a situation where the poor but not the middle class are excluded from some markets.
When the poor and the middle class are very similar, the poor and the middle class are excluded
from the same markets, and so on. It is obvious that this line of reasoning can be extended to
the general case with x diﬀerent groups of households. The equilibrium will be characterized
by z ≤ x diﬀerent types of firms, where z is weakly smaller than x reflecting the fact that
the market equilibrium merges very similar groups. Furthermore, a redistribution of income
from richer to poorer households has analogous eﬀects as the redistribution discussed in the
two-group economy, provided the redistribution occurs between groups which are suﬃciently
diﬀerent.
9 Conclusions
Recent macroeconomic analysis has focused on the role of consumer heterogeneity on aggregate
outcomes. Our analysis extends this literature along two dimensions. First, our analysis
explores the combination of non-homothetic preferences and monopolistic market power as the
important channel by which economic inequality aﬀects the general equilibrium. This channel
has not been much studied in the literature which has emphasized capital market imperfections
(e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993) or political-economy considerations (e.g. Bertola, 1993) or some
combination of the two (e.g. Be´nabou, 1996). Second, we study how economic inequality
aﬀects the medium run, in particular, the level of aggregate employment and the allocation of
labor across industries. This is diﬀerent from the recent literature which has predominantly
studied the eﬀect of inequality in the context of long-run economic growth.
We introduced non-homothetic preferences in a very stylized way. Instead of CES-preferences
we have assumed that preferences are quadratic. This seemingly minor change in assumptions
changes the character of the general equilibrium. Suﬃciently high inequality divides an oth-
erwise symmetric economy into mass consumption industries and exclusive industries; and it
may lead to underemployment of the work force. Moreover, the model predicts that underem-
ployment can be cured by redistributive policies; and that the eﬀect of incomes policies (which
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increase wages at the expense of profits) is ambiguous due to the dual role of real wages as a
cost- and a demand-factor. We have also shown that our results generalize to more general
assumptions on preferences.
Our model could be extended in various directions. First, our model is static and it may
be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a dynamic context. Allowing for innovation deci-
sions brings interesting new elements into the picture. When new products are introduced,
unemployment will eventually disappear. When more eﬃcient production processes are im-
plemented, however, unemployment will even increase for two reasons. On the one hand,
higher productivity makes workers increasingly redundant. On the other hand, as unemploy-
ment hurts the poor disproportionately, the resulting increase in inequality depresses aggregate
employment even further. A second potentially interesting extension concerns international
trade. Our model is closed and opening it up for international trade would allow to explore
the interaction between increasing returns and economic inequality as a determinant of trade
flows. Inter alia this may provide a rationale for why terms of trade may be aﬀected by demand
considerations (such as the relative size of home markets) and income distribution.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma (1) Maximizing the profit function [p(j)− w/a]x(p(j)) using () it is
straightforward to calculate the respective monopoly prices along these two segments as
p(j) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
p¯ = 12 [w/a+ s/λR]
p = 12 [w/a+ s/ (βλP + (1− β)λR)]
if only the rich buy,
if all consumers buy.
We express the λ’s in terms of p¯, p, and w and substitute the resulting expressions into the
individual demands (2). This yields
cEP = 0, c
M
P = s− sβ
h
1
2p−w/a −
1−β
2p¯−w/a
i
p,
cER = s− s
h
1
2p¯−w/a
i
p¯, cMR = s− s
h
1
2p¯−w/a
i
p,
where cEi denotes the quantity purchased by a consumer of type i ∈ {R,P} when the firm
chooses the exclusive strategy (= charges the high price) and cMi denotes the respective
quantities when the firm chooses the mass consumption strategy (= charges the low price).
The equilibrium output of exclusive producers is xE = (1 − β)cER and of mass producers,
xM = βcMP + (1− β)cMR . Using the above expressions for cMP cER, and cMR yields the values for
xE and xM .
B. Proof of Proposition 1 Selling exclusive goods yields market demand (1− β) (s− λRp).
The profit maximizing price is (w/a+ s/λR) /2, which yields profits
ΠE = (1− β) (s− λRw/a)2 / (4λR) .
Selling mass consumption goods yields market demand s − [βλP + (1− β)λR] p. The profit
maximizing price is [w/a+ s/ (βλP + (1− β)λR)] /2, which yields profits
ΠM = [s− (βλP + (1− β)λR)w/a]2 / [4 (βλP + (1− β)λR)] .
In a symmetric equilibrium we must have ΠM ≥ ΠE so that no firm has an incentive to deviate
and adopt the exclusion strategy. In asymmetric equilibria, mass consumption producers and
exclusive producers must earn the same profit ΠM = ΠE. A situation where ΠM < ΠE cannot
be an equilibrium: no firm would sell to the poor, which would leave them with idle purchasing
power and very high willingness to pay for some goods. Let us now find a condition under
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which no firm has an incentive to sell exclusively to the rich. For a given wage level w ≥ w∗ we
evaluate equilibrium profits in a symmetric equilibrium where all firms have demand aLD(w)/N
and denote these profits by Π˜E and Π˜M . To eliminate λP and λR note that we can express
the marginal utility of income as λi = s −∆iaLD(w)/N.Since γ ≤ δ we must have ∆P ≤ δ.
To find a suﬃcient condition for an asymmetric equilibrium we evaluate the marginal utilities
of income at the lowest level of inequality, i.e., where ∆P = δ. and we get the critical profits
levels Π˜E and Π˜M in terms of w and exogenous parameters
Π˜E =
wa
4N
(1− β)LD(w)2
¡
(1 +∆R) sN − 2∆RaLD(w)
¢2
(sN − aLD(w)) (sN − 2aLD(w)) (sN −∆RaLD(w))
, and Π˜M =
wa
N
LD(w)2
sN − 2aLD(w) .
(12)
The symmetric outcome is an equilibrium if, starting from a situation where all firms charge
a price that attracts the whole customer base, no single firm has an incentive to deviate and
adopt the exclusive good strategy. In other words, the inequality Π˜E < Π˜M must hold strictly.
Using equations (12), noting that ∆R = (1− βδ) / (1− β) , we get
β <
4δ (1− z)2
4δ2z (1− z)− 4δz + (1 + δ)2
. (13)
where aLD(w)/(sN) = (1− w/a) / (2− w/a) = z must hold in the labor market equilibrium.
The right hand side of (13) is monotonically decreasing in z over the relevant range. Taking the
derivative with respect to z gives −8(1− δ)δ(1− z)/(1+ δ(1− 2z))3 < 0. As ζ = LD(w)z < z,
the condition in proposition 1 is suﬃcient.
C. Entry with skilled labor input Assume there are skilled and unskilled workers. G
units of skilled labor are needed to set up a new firm. Final output is produced with skilled
and unskilled labor using the CRS technology y = aF (hY , l) where hY and l. Aggregate
production employment equals HY = NhY for the skilled and L = Nl for the unskilled.
The production function has an associated marginal cost function which we denote by mc ≡
(wH/a) · c (wL/wH) , with c0 > 0 where wL and wH denote the skilled and unskilled wage,
respectively. In equilibrium, all firms choose the same factor intensity HY /L and the wage
ratio must satisfy the condition wL/wH = FL(hY , l)/FH(hY , l) = ϕ (HY /L) with ϕ0 > 0. All
other elements of the model are unchanged.
The model has four endogenous variables: mc, n, HY , and M. The equilibrium condi-
tions are (7) (where w is now replaced by mc), the resource constraint which now changes to
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aF (HY , (1−u)L) = s (N +M) [n (1−mc) / (2−mc) + (1− n)(1− β) (g(mc)−mc) / (2g(mc)−mc)]
the zero-profit condition now given by wHG = Π(mc), and the feasible number of entrants
M = G(H −HY ). We get rid of wH by using wH = a ·mc/c(ϕ (HY /L)) to obtain a ·mc ·G ·
c (ϕ (HY /L))−1 = s (1−mc)2 / (2−mc) .
We can now easily solve the model by focusing on two equations (the free-entry condition
and the resource constraint) in the two unknowns mc and HY . The right-hand-side of the
free-entry condition decreases in mc and the left-hand-side decreases in HY /L which defines
a monotonically increasing curve in the (HY , mc) space. The resource constraint defines a
(non-monotonic or upward sloping) curve in (HY , mc) space.
Proposition 6 There exists an equilibrium with HY ≥ 0. a) If the elasticity of substitution
ε between production factors is between zero and one, 0 < ε ≤ 1, HY > 0 and there is no
unemployment among the low skilled. b) If ε > 1, there may be unemployment. Unemployment
arises if sGH (1 + ϑ− β) /2 < aF (0, L).
Proof. Existence. The slope of the equilibrium curves is discussed above. The labor
demand curve crosses the HY - axis at aF (HY , L)/(sG (H −HY )) = (1 − β)/2 which must
occur at a bHY < H. If the curves do not cross, HY = 0 in equilibrium.
a. When intercept of the resource constraint at the mc-axis exceeds that of the free entry
curve, HY > 0 must hold in equilibrium. To see this note first, if ε ≤ 1, the resource constraint
only holds true for HY = 0 when mc = 1. On the other hand, both factors are necessary in
production or F (0, L) = 0. In that case c (φ (0)) = c(0) = 0, hence the value of marginal costs
mc satisfying the free-entry condition goes to zero when HY approaches zero.
b. If ε > 1, positive production can be achieved using one factor only F (0, L) > 0. In a
possible unemployment equilibrium, mark-ups are infinite and aggregate demand for low skilled
labor equals GH (1 + ϑ− β) s/2. If this number falls short of aF (0, L), there is unemployment
with a zero wage.
If skilled workers are a necessary input in the production of final output (ε ≤ 1) unem-
ployment cannot arise when the labor market is perfect. If skilled workers are not a necessary
input, however, unemployment can arise even if the unskilled wage goes to zero. In that case,
the productivity of the unskilled is aF (0, L). The maximum number of entrants is pinned
down by the stock of high skilled workers, M = GH, and the total number of firms is given by
GH +N. In that case, we are back in the model studied in section 6.
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D. More general preferences We show the following: With HARA preferences and v0(0)
finite, more inequality raises markups in a unique asymmetric equilibrium.
When preferences are HARA, v(.) is given by v0(c) = (c/σ + s)−σ with s > 0 and σ ∈ <.
Note that we get for σ = −1 the quadratic utility function used above. The assumption of
s > 0 guarantees that v0(0) is finite. The elasticity of substitution equals c/(c/σ + s) which is
monotonically increasing in c.
We will consider an asymmetric equilibrium with full employment. Note that unemploy-
ment equilibria are possible when the demand curve exhibits a revenue maximum when the
elasticity of substitution −v0(c)/(v00(c)c) falls below unity at some finite c (which occurs if and
only if σ < 1). The generalized Stone-Geary with σ < 1 and negative consumption requirement
satisfies this property, for example.
Denote by xE and xM consumption of mass and exclusive goods, respectively. Instead of
the price of mass consumption goods, we now normalize marginal costs w/a = 1 and get the
following Lerner indices
p¯− 1
p¯
=
xE(1− β)
xE(1− β)/σ + s (A1)
and
p− 1
p
=
xM
xM/σ + s
. (A2)
The profit arbitrage condition is given by¡
p− 1
¢
xM = (p¯− 1)xE. (A3)
For simplicity, we consider a full employment equilibrium, hence the aggregate resource con-
straint reads
nxM + (1− n)xE = 1. (A4)
Now consider a rise in inequality. In a unique equilibrium, more inequality leads to more
exclusion, i.e., a decrease in n. Assume to the contrary that p¯ falls. By (A1), xE must
also decrease. (A3) then implies that
¡
p− 1
¢
xM falls. From (A2) we know, however, that
p and xM are positively related. Therefore, both p and xM must decrease. Taken together
nxM +(1−n)xE must fall (recall that xM > xE). But this contradicts the aggregate resource
constraint (A4). Hence, we conclude p¯ must increase. By the same reasoning, xE and therefore
p and xM must increase. Thus, markups rise.
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                        Figure 1: Aggregate Demand and Monopolistic Pricing Decision 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with Unemployment 
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Figure 3: Impact of More Inequality  
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Figure 4: Full Employment Equilibrium 
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Figure 5: Multiple Equilibria 
 
 
Employment 
Wage 
a
 
DL
w
 
SL
